Although sanctions were occasionally applied earlier in this century – e.g., by the League of Nations against Italy for the invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s, by Europe and the US against Japan for the invasion of China in the 1930s – since the end of the Cold War, and as the use of military force has become less acceptable, sanctions have become an increasingly popular instrument for coercing governments to change behavior and/or policies. The U.S. government, and Congress in particular, has especially favored sanctions, multilateral and unilateral, as a tool for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals in recent years.

To illustrate the growing use of sanctions, between 1945 and 1990 the UN Security Council applied sanctions only twice, against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Since 1990 the Security Council has imposed sanctions eight times. Of the 115 times the U.S. employed sanctions since World War I, 61 occurred between 1993 and 1996. By one count, 75 countries are now subject to or threatened by U.S. sanctions.1 There have also been a limited number of recent instances when regional intergovernmental bodies have imposed sanctions (e.g. the Organization of American States against Haiti and East African states against Burundi).

A growing body of experience indicates that sanctions frequently fall far short of achieving their political goals but have devastating consequences for large numbers of people in the sanctioned countries. This experience has recently stimulated a re-assessment of sanctions, including thinking about how sanctions might be restructured to avoid some of their more serious humanitarian consequences.

In September 1997 the UN General Assembly adopted a set of guidelines for the imposition of UN sanctions that called for minimizing "unintended adverse side effects on the civilian population" by including humanitarian exceptions in Security Council sanctions resolutions. Cautioning that sanctions should be resorted to only when other peaceful options under the UN Charter are inadequate, the guidelines specified:

Foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies should be exempted from United Nations sanctions regimes. Basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items should also be exempted; a list should be drawn up for that purpose. Other essential humanitarian goods should be considered for exemption by the relevant United Nations bodies, including the sanctions committees.

In spite of continued interest in sanctions as a foreign policy choice, re-examination is also under way within the U.S. government, although it is too early to predict what long-term effect this reassessment will have. A taskforce in the State Department's Economic and Business Bureau is engaged in a review of sanctions policy. Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, who heads the taskforce, outlined a series of principles to guide U.S. use of economic sanctions, including the following, in testimony to Congress in June 1998:

1) Economic sanctions should be used as a last resort, when all diplomatic options have been tried and have failed.

2) Sanctions are most effective when they have broad multilateral support.

3) If multilateral support is impossible, and if important national interests or core values are at stake, the U.S. must be prepared to act unilaterally. Costs and benefits must be carefully weighed.

4) Sanctions should seek to influence behavior, not simply punish.

5) Costs should be proportional. Sanctions should be designed so that, to the extent possible, costs are borne by the targeted country rather than falling on innocent people and on the U.S. business community and citizens.

6) To be effective, sanctions decisions require policy harmony among the Administration, Congress, governments at the state and local level, the business community, and NGOs. More systematic discussions between the Administration and Congress are required when sanctions are being considered.

7) The President needs flexibility in the application of economic sanctions in order to respond effectively and appropriately to changing circumstances.

In Congress, under pressure from U.S. business interests, Sen. Lugar (R-IN) and Rep. Hamilton (D-IN) introduced a bill in autumn 1997 that would require analysis of the likely impact of sanctions on U.S. foreign policy, on economic and humanitarian interests, and on the private sector prior to their imposition. The bill also calls for avoiding, to the extent possible, any adverse impact on the humanitarian activities of U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations, and for putting a two-year limit on any sanctions unless Congress renews them.

An attempt by Sen. Lugar in July 1998 to insert these provisions in the fiscal year 1999 agricultural appropriations bill failed, but two other amendments limiting sanctions were adopted. In response to concerns from farmers about sanctions endangering farm exports, Congress authorized a one-year waiver on sanctions on India and Pakistan. A second amendment exempted the sale of food, fertilizer, medicine, and medical equipment from current and future unilateral sanctions. As an indication that Congress is still of two minds on sanctions, however, a later amendment was adopted preventing the exemption from applying to countries (Cuba, for example) that are on the State Department's list of terrorist states or that deny access to food and medicine as a method of political coercion.

Congressional supporters of sanctions argue that they can be a useful tool to address issues such as terrorism, drugs, anti-nuclear proliferation and other policy concerns. Those who would like to restrict the use of sanctions argue that all too often they hurt U.S. businesses or farmers and result in unacceptable humanitarian impact on the civilian population in the sanctioned country.